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The crop insurance program has grown significantly since passage of the 2002 Farm Bill.
Total premiums more than doubled from $2.9 billion in 2002 to $6.6 billion in 2007. This
growth in the crop insurance program is due to a combination of greater participation by
growers at higher levels of coverage, an increased number of crops with coverage available,
and a general rise in commodity prices. Not unexpectedly, there has been a corresponding
increase in the cost of program delivery. The total amount of expense subsidy and
underwriting gains paid to crop insurance companies increased from around $1 billion in
2001
1 to over $2.5 billion in 2007.
The profile of insurance coverage has changed
as well, with a significant shift in demand
away from yield-based coverage to revenue-
based coverage. There has also been greater
demand for area-based insurance coverage.
The growth of the crop insurance program,
along with the shift toward revenue- and area-
based coverage, have contributed to crop
insurance having a greater role in the 2007
Farm Bill than in previous Farm Bills.
A significant focus of the 2007 Farm Bill
deliberations has been the desire to obtain
cost savings from the crop insurance program
to fund other farm program initiatives. For
example, both the Senate and House versions
of the Farm Bill seek to reduce the amount
of administrative and operating (A&O) sub-
sidy provided to insurance companies. Fur-
ther, the House version contains a measure
that would reduce the underwriting gains
paid to insurance companies. The House
version would also reduce premium subsidies
for the area-based plans of insurance while
both versions would increase the administra-
tive fee charged for catastrophic (CAT)
coverage.
The focus of the selected papers, however,
is on the new commodity program concepts
that have been introduced in the course of the
Farm Bill deliberations, in particular, the use
of revenue-based farm program payments
instead of the traditional price support pro-
gram. The proposed revenue programs are
structured as area-based revenue payments
and so resemble crop insurance coverage to a
far greater degree than the commodity pro-
grams in previous farm bills. This has
potentially significant implications for the
crop insurance program.
The three papers presented at this selected
paper session provide several insights into the
potential interactions between the crop insur-
ance program and the new commodity pro-
grams proposed in the 2007 Farm Bill. They
also provide an analysis of factors that have
1Total payments to crop insurance companies fell
to $580 million in 2002 as they suffered an under-
writing loss of about $44 million on program opera-
tions. From 1992 to 2007, the companies experienced
only two underwriting losses: in 1993, and again in
2002.
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choices of growers.
Safety Nets or Trampolines
The proposed revenue-based commodity pro-
grams lead to the larger issue of the federal
government’s role in risk management for
growers. Goodwin and Rejesus perhaps put it
best when they asked: ‘‘Is it cost-effective for
the government to offer two revenue programs
that seem to mitigate the same types of risks?’’
With more than one program paying for the
samedecrease inyieldorrevenue, growers have
the potential to collect an amount that exceeds
their underlying loss—a ‘‘trampoline’’ effect to
their income. The opening section of their
paper, ‘‘Safety Nets or Trampolines: Federal
Crop Insurance, Disaster Assistance, and the
Farm Bill,’’ provides an excellent overview of
the agricultural policy, risk management, and
the crop insurance program.
The analysis presented in the Goodwin and
Rejesus paper combines data from several
sources into a recursively structured model
that reflects the timing of crop insurance
decisions, disaster assistance receipts, and crop
sales. The central implication from the anal-
ysis is that disaster assistance tends to crowd
out crop insurance. This seems intuitive—why
pay for something that is otherwise provided
free?
The paper restricts its focus to the interac-
tion between ad hoc disaster assistance and
crop insurance. However, there is a proposal
in the 2007 Farm Bill to provide growers with
a standing disaster assistance program. An
interesting extension of the paper would be to
consider what implications the analysis of ad
hoc disaster assistance may hold for the
potential effect of a standing disaster program
on the demand for crop insurance.
The analysis is rich with other implications
about the factors influencing the demand for
crop insurance. Demand is positively related
to a grower’s net return from insurance
payments, number of acres, and share of sales
from livestock. Higher premium rates—as well
as consistent disaster payments—discourage
crop insurance purchases.
Revenue versus Yield Insurance
The effect of government payments on a
grower’s binary decision of whether to pur-
chase crop insurance is only part of the story.
For those growers that purchase crop insur-
ance, government payments can affect the
optimal type of coverage to select. Quantifying
this effect is necessary to understanding the
potential effects of the 2007 Farm Bill’s
proposed commodity programs on crop in-
surance.
Vedenov and Power, in their paper entitled
‘‘Risk-Reducing Effectiveness of Revenue
versus Yield Insurance in the Presence of
Government Payments,’’ simulate the effect of
commodity program payments, both current
and proposed, on a representative corn grower
in Iowa and Texas. They apply an expected
utility framework and measure the effect of
various coverage choices according to their
effect on the grower’s certainty–equivalent
wealth. A kernel copula is used in the
modeling the joint distribution of prices and
yields—an innovation that requires less re-
strictive assumptions.
The results of the analysis indicate that,
given the current commodity programs, reve-
nue coverage is generally preferred to yield
coverage. Also, the optimal coverage level is
lower in the Texas (high-yield risk) than in
Iowa (low-yield risk). This provides a theoret-
ical underpinning for the shift toward revenue
that has been observed in the crop insurance
program. It also helps explain why the average
coverage level tends to be lower in high-risk
areas.
The analysis also considers the difference in
the insured price for corn between revenue
coverage and yield coverage, finding that yield
coverage becomes more attractive as its price
converges to that offered for revenue cover-
age. This explains the observation that the
general year-to-year increase in the proportion
of growers selecting revenue coverage slows
down, or even reverses, in years when the yield
price is at or above the revenue price.
The paper suggests that the yield price
should be brought closer to the revenue price.
As it turns out, the Federal Crop Insurance
462 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, August 2008Corporation (FCIC) has proposed regulations
that will move yield and revenue insurance
prices to the same basis.
The paper also repeats the same analysis,
but under the revenue-based programs pro-
posed in the 2007 Farm Bill. Under this
scenario, the general preference for revenue
coverage remains in the low-risk example, but
not in the high-risk example.
There are a couple of potential extensions
to the analysis presented in this paper. For
example, the proposed commodity programs
give growers the option to remain with the
current commodity programs. This brings up
the question of what option growers will
choose. The analysis in this paper clearly
applies to this question.
Another potential extension concerns the
FCIC’s proposed regulations that would make
yield and revenue prices the same. When
growers are faced with the same insured price
for both yield and revenue coverage, what
would be their optimal choice? What would be
the interactive effects between the proposed
regulations and the proposed commodity
programs in the Farm Bill? The analytical
framework developed for this paper appears
well-suited to address these questions.
Integrating Commodity Programs and
Crop Insurance
The implications of the proposed revenue-
based programs go well beyond the effects of
growers’ crop insurance purchasing decisions.
Coble and Barnett bring up the broader
question of how systemic risk should be
addressed in their paper entitled ‘‘Implications
of Integrated Commodity Programs and Crop
Insurance,’’ In particular, the authors explore
the risk-reducing effects of area-based revenue
programs.
The paper presents a model that simulates
yield and revenue at the individual, county,
and state levels of aggregation—while ac-
counting for correlations across the various
levels of aggregation and between price and
yield. The model is then used to address the
question of how much the expected mean and
variance of the loss cost for individual
insurance coverage would be reduced if losses
from systemic risk were removed.
Systemic losses are based either on a state-
level index (as in the Senate’s proposed
Average Crop Revenue proposal) or a nation-
al-level index (the House’s proposed Revenue
Counter-Cyclical Program). A county-level
index (such as FCIC’s group risk programs)
is considered as well.
The results indicate that the removal of
systemic risk can result in significant decreases
in the mean and variance of loss costs for
individual insurance policies—especially if the
systemic risk is based on a state- or county-
level index.
The authors point to some broad implica-
tions that these results could have for how risk
is managed. If the federal government absorbs
a sufficient degree of the systemic risk, such as
through the Average Crop Revenue Proposal,
then the remaining residual risk might poten-
tially be borne entirely by the private insur-
ance industry. In this sense, the proposed area-
based commodity programs provide a form of
reinsurance that protects insurance companies
from losses that are correlated across insured
units, such as a drought.
While the paper provides an interesting
discussion systemic risk and federal agricul-
tural programs, the degree to which the
model’s results support such a possibility is
unclear. While a state- or county-based index
payment clearly reduces the mean and vari-
ance of crop risk, is the reduction enough for
private insurers to accommodate it? A helpful
extension of the paper would be to put the
model’s results in the context of the property
and casualty industry in general, such as a
comparison of the residual crop risk to the
level of risk private insurance companies face
in other lines of insurance.
Conclusions
The three papers presented present useful
insights into the factors influencing growers’
crop insurance choices and the potential
influence the 2007 Farm Bill will have in those
choices. However, the fundamental question
these papers point to is how the systemic risk
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In its original version, the Chairman’s mark of
the Senate’s Farm Bill directly addressed this
question by having the proposed Average
Crop Revenue payments offset crop insurance
indemnities. In this context, the commodity
program would handle systemic risk and the
crop insurance program handles the remaining
risk. This avoids redundant payments for the
same revenue loss (‘trampoline’ effect) and
lowers crop insurance premiums. This mea-
sure, however, was later dropped.
It is likely that question of systemic risk
and agricultural policy will play a significant
role in future farm bills. The papers in this
session help to inform this debate as well as
provide a solid foundation for further research
on this question.
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